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Collective Reputation in Trade:
Evidence from the Chinese Dairy Industry
Jie Bai, Ludovica Gazze, Yukun Wang1
Abstract
The existence of collective reputation implies an important externality. In the con-
text of international trade, quality shocks affecting one firm could affect the demand
of other firms in the same origin country. We study such reputation spillovers in
the context of a large-scale scandal that affected the Chinese dairy industry in 2008.
Leveraging administrative data at the firm-product level and official quality inspection
reports, we find that after the scandal, the export revenue of firms with contaminated
products dropped by 84% relative to the national industry trend. We estimate the
spillover effect on firms without contaminated products to be 64% of the direct ef-
fect, with firms that successfully passed government inspections suffering as much as
uninspected firms. We further investigate the potential mechanisms underlying these
reputation spillover effects. We find that the spillover effects are smaller for destina-
tions where people have better information about the parties involved in the scandal.
The spillover effects appear to be generalized, rather than contained to the specific
areas with suppliers of contaminated products, consistent with global buyers having
coarse information about the sources of contamination. Finally, new exporters and
firms with less export experience are more vulnerable to collective reputation damage
than established exporters. (JEL: F10, F14, L15, L66, O10, O19)
1Contact: Jie Bai: jie bai@hks.harvard.edu; Ludovica Gazze: Ludovica.Gazze@warwick.ac.uk; Yukun
Wang: yw2234@cornell.edu. We thank Rodrigo Adao, Abhijit Banerjee, Chris Blattman, Oeindrila Dube,
Ben Faber, Rema Hanna, Asim Khwaja, Rocco Machiavello, Nina Pavnick, Nancy Qian, Daniel Xu and
participants at the HKS Growth Lab seminar, Microsoft Research lab seminar, Entrepreneurship and Pri-
vate Enterprise Development (EPED) in Emerging Economies Workshop, and the IGC/CDEP/Chazen
Firms/Trade/Development conference for helpful comments. We thank Hongyuan Xia for providing ex-
cellent research assistance. All errors are our own.
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1 Introduction
In markets with information frictions, quality shocks about one firm’s products may impose
an externality on other firms selling similar products. In such settings, when an incident
damages the group’s reputation, firms can become trapped in a low-trust-low-quality equi-
librium, and new entrants may inherit the damaged reputation of their predecessors. Tirole
(1996) formalizes the theory of collective reputation. Empirically, how important is collective
reputation, and what are the potential mechanisms that mediate its effects?
We study collective reputation in the context of trade and development. In interna-
tional markets, producers from the same origin country are often viewed as a group: for
example, we refer to Swiss watches, French wines, and “made-in-China” products. For firms
in developing countries, which are mostly positioned at the lower end of the value-added
chain and export mainly non-branded products, a long international supply chain can make
it particularly difficult to trace products to an individual producer. As a result, collective
reputation becomes especially important in determining firms’ export performance. In fact,
rising safety and quality concerns regarding goods from developing countries in recent years
can significantly hinder firms from penetrating high-end markets.2 In a recent survey of over
600 manufacturing firms in China, firms report lack of reputation and mistrust as one of the
main challenges in exporting to global markets.3 Therefore, understanding how collective
reputation spreads within an industry or a geographic area is important for informing trade
and development policies.
We exploit a large-scale quality scandal that affected the Chinese dairy industry in 2008.
Similar to many industries in developing countries and emerging markets, the Chinese dairy
2A list of food contamination incidents can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List_of_food_contamination_incidents#2001_to_present. Recent prominent cases in-
clude the Chinese dairy scandal of 2008 and the Brazilian meat scandal of June 2017 (see
an Economist article on the latter incident: https://www.economist.com/news/business/
21719416-chile-china-and-eu-have-banned-some-or-all-countrys-meat-meat-scandal-brazil).
3The survey was administered by the Jinan Institute for Economic and Social Research (IESR) and
the Guangzhou General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ). We
thank IESR for sharing the survey instruments and the data.
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industry was dominated by a large number of small and non-established players that ex-
hibited rapid growth prior to the scandal. Using administrative data on quality inspections
conducted by the Chinese government following the scandal, we identify the firms and the
products at each firm that failed inspections (contaminated product-firm pairs) and those
products and firms for which no contamination was ever detected.4 We merge the official
inspection lists with Chinese Customs data at the firm-product level and Manufacturing Sur-
vey data at the firm level to examine the direct effects of the scandal both on contaminated
product-firm pairs and on other products within the firms with contamination (within-firm
spillovers) as well as the effects on firms with no contamination and on uninspected firms
(cross-firm spillovers).
We begin by showing that the scandal had a large impact on the overall export per-
formance of the entire dairy sector in China, thus providing an ideal setting for studying
within-sector spillovers. Using a difference-in-differences (DD) framework, we find that the
average value of dairy exports plummeted by 68% following the scandal and failed to recover
even after five years. This estimate captures both the direct impact on firms with contami-
nated products and the spillovers to other firms and products. Decomposing the direct versus
indirect impacts, we estimate an aggregate spillover effect of 57%, about four-fifths of the
total effect size. Our estimates are robust to various empirical specifications that relax the
classical DD assumption. To the extent that products by different dairy firms are imperfect
substitutes, the estimates provide a lower bound on the collective reputation effect.
Next, we investigate how the spillover effects are distributed across different firms and
products. We leverage our detailed micro data on export activities and inspection outcomes
at the firm-product level. Our results suggest that contaminated firms saw a drop of 84% in
export revenue after the scandal relative to the national industrial trend. These firms were
also 14.2% less likely to export following the scandal. Furthermore, we find that both firms
4We conducted an extensive news search through LexisNexis to cross-validate the official inspection
reports. See Section 3.3 for more details.
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verified to be free of contamination and uninspected firms experienced an equally significant
decline in export revenue of about 64% of the decline suffered by directly affected firms.
Moreover, firms that successfully passed government inspections did not fare any better
than uninspected firms. Altogether, these findings point to large reputation spillovers and
highlight the potential challenges of government actions to help firms signal quality and
restore trust.
Finally, we investigate potential mechanisms that may underlie the observed spillover
effects. Since a firm’s reputation is essentially constituted by buyers’ beliefs and perceptions,
how consumers gather information and learn matters crucially for reputation externalities.
Specifically, we examine the role of 1) information accuracy in global media reports, 2) firms’
location and the traceability of suppliers affected by contamination episodes, and 3) firms’
export experience, which proxies for the strength of individual reputation.
First, to study the role of information accuracy in global media, we construct a measure of
consumers’ knowledge of the scandal across different countries, using Google Trends Search
indices for phrases that reflect a more or less accurate depiction of the event. We find that
the spillover effects are smaller in countries where people appear to have better information
about the parties directly involved in the scandal, reflected in more targeted internet search
behavior. In particular, the cross-firm spillover effects are primarily driven by exports to
destinations with low information accuracy.
Second, we use the Chinese Customs data to identify the sourcing locations of each ex-
porting firm prior to the scandal to examine the impact on firms that passed inspections and
uninspected firms of sourcing from the same locations as firms affected by the contamination.
Interestingly, we find that the spillover effects appear to be generalized rather than contained
within specific areas. This is consistent with international buyers having coarse information
about contamination sources due to low traceability of the contaminated inputs.
Third, to examine the interaction between collective and individual reputation, we exploit
baseline variation in firms’ export experience, as measured by the number of years a firm has
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been exporting and the share of exports in total sales at baseline. We find that young firms
and firms with a smaller baseline share of exports in total sales are more vulnerable to the
collective reputation shock. The results suggest that having a more established individual
reputation can (partially) shield firms from the collective damage, whereas newcomers suffer
more from the “original sin” of the predecessors (Tirole, 1996).
A growing empirical literature studies firm reputation and quality provision in markets
with information frictions (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Jin and Leslie, 2009; Macchiavello,
2010; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010; Björkman-Nyqvist, Svensson, and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2013;
Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Tsumagari, 2013). While information frictions appear to play an
important role in international trade (Allen, 2014; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015; Startz,
2017), these frictions remain understudied (Atkin and Khandelwal, Forthcoming). We build
upon these two bodies of research by examining the role of group reputation in trade. Our
results demonstrate that collective reputation forces can have important implications for a
country’s trade patterns, contributing to a country’s comparative advantage.
Despite earlier works on the theory of collective reputation (Tirole, 1996; Winfree and Mc-
Cluskey, 2005; Fleckinger, 2007; Levin, 2009; Fishman, Simhon, Finkelshtain, and Yacouel,
2010), empirical studies on the subject remain scarce (Bai, 2018; Zhao, 2018). Exploiting
a natural experiment, our results explicitly identify this important source of externalities
and illustrate how its effects are mediated by various informational and market forces. Two
other papers exploit similar natural experiments to study collective reputation spillovers.
Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman (2012) examine toy recalls in the US and document siz-
able industry-wide spillover effects independent of origin country.5 Bachmann, Ehrlich, Fan,
and Ruzic (2019) find large spillover effects a year after the Volkswagen scandal on US sales
5Our paper also speaks broadly to the literature on quality scandals and product recalls. Most previous
studies in this literature have either relied on laboratory experiments to examine consumer reactions to
hypothetical product scandals (e.g., Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000)) or focused primarily on
stock market outcomes using an event-study approach (e.g., (Davidson and Worrell, 1992)). Furthermore,
with the exception of Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman (2012), most studies focus on losses in firms’ own
sales and stock market price (Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe, 2007; Jovanovic et al., 2020) rather than
cross-firm spillovers.
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of other German cars. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one with a long
enough post period to examine the persistence of collective reputation damage. More work is
needed to compare developing and developed countries as well as different market settings.6
Finally, our study relates to the broad literature on firm performance and quality up-
grading in development and trade (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014). Previous studies have
examined (1) supply-side constraints, including credit access, lack of quality inputs, and man-
agerial constraints (e.g., De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008); Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012); Banerjee (2013); Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)), and (2)
demand side factors, including access to high-income markets (e.g., Verhoogen (2008); Park,
Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010); Manova and Zhang (2012); Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman
(2017)). Atkin and Khandelwal (Forthcoming) highlight that information frictions may sig-
nificantly inhibit trading opportunities for firms in developing countries. Our paper is one
of the first to document how a poor collective reputation deriving from information frictions
affects firms’ export performance in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the 2008 scandal, and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
evidence on the overall impact of the scandal on the dairy industry. Section 5 analyzes
reputation spillovers across firms and products. Section 6 examines mechanisms. Section 7
concludes.
2 Background on the 2008 Chinese Dairy Scandal
The Chinese dairy industry exhibited fast growth during the early 2000s in terms of both
domestic production and exports. Prior to 2008, the industry grew at an average annual
6There is also a literature in agricultural and resource economics that studies collective reputation in the
food and beverage industries in relation to products and labels such as Bordeaux wine and regional appel-
lations. Most studies use hedonic price regressions to examine the role of group reputation (e.g., Castriota
and Delmastro (2014); Marchini, Riganelli, Diotallevi, and Paffarini (2014); Gergaud, Livat, Rickard, and
Warzynski (2017)). We take advantage of a natural experiment that allows us to relax the identification
assumptions.
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rate of almost 24%. Figure 1 shows that the industry’s annual export value increased more
than threefold from 2000 to 2007. The number of exporting firms increased from 150 in
2000 to 335 in 2007.7 Nonetheless, in 2007, dairy exports still constituted a relatively small
share of all dairy production in China and accounted for only $300 million of the country’s
$1.2 trillion export revenue. Like many other industries in developing countries, the Chinese
dairy industry was dominated by a large number of small and non-established players.
Over the past decade, an increasing number of quality and safety issues have affected
Chinese food products. One of the most widely known incidents is the distribution of con-
taminated baby formula in September 2008, hereinafter referred to as “the scandal”. Infant
formula had been illegally adulterated with the industrial chemical melamine to mimic a
higher protein content. Melamine, commonly used in the manufacture of plastics, has been
linked to an increased risk of kidney stones (Hau, Kwan, and Li, 2009). The incident led to
4 infant deaths, 51,900 hospitalizations of children and the nationwide recall of 700 tons of
milk powder.
Following the outbreak, the Chinese government quickly shut down the supplier of the
contaminated milk powder, Sanlu Group, one of the largest dairy firms in China. However,
further investigations revealed that the adulteration stemmed from malpractices of some
upstream milk producers, raising the suspicion that more downstream dairy firms could
have been affected.8 This discovery led to three rounds of government inspections: the first
round targeted firms producing infant formula—109 firms were inspected, and 22 were found
to have traces of melamine in their products. The next two rounds targeted producers of milk
powder and liquid milk, respectively, and covered most dairy producers in China. During
the second round, the government inspected 154 randomly sampled milk powder producers
7Figure 1 shows a spike in export growth between 2006 and 2007, when the total value of exports increased
by about 138%. This spike was mainly driven by new firms entering the export market. Specifically, 30 firms
contributed more than 80% of the growth spike; over 50% of the spike was driven by a single product—milk
powder; finally, over 50% of the spike was driven by exports to 6 destinations, namely, Thailand, Germany,
Bangladesh, Taiwan, UAE and Hong Kong.
8According to the investigation reports, these malpractices were “open secrets” in the industry. See
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122567367498791713.
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(together making up over 70% of the market share) out of 290 producers nationwide and
found 20 to be contaminated. During the third round, the government targeted another
466 established dairy brands with large market shares and found that 9 plants of 3 major
brands were contaminated. That said, large firms appear to have been disproportionately
targeted in the second inspection round as well: in Section 3.4, we find that inspected firms
are significantly larger in terms of baseline sales and employment. Our identification strategy
accounts for this imbalance by including a rich set of baseline controls interacted with time
to allow for differential growth trajectories between large and small firms.9
These inspections uncovered contamination in several dairy and dairy-related products,
including yogurt, milk, cheese, baby food, and cake. Product recalls were immediately
issued. By the end of 2008, the Chinese government had issued an official statement that the
incident had been fully addressed and that proper measures had been put in place to ensure
the safety of the dairy products on the market.10 Corroborating the Chinese government’s
statement, data from the EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), which
publishes safety notifications and recalls for imported food products, show that notifications
related to melamine contamination in dairy products imported from China surged in the fall
of 2008 but quickly subsided a few months after the initial outbreak (Figure A.1).
Despite the official statement, the scandal triggered widespread fears over food safety in
China. Thousands of Chinese dairy-related products were pulled from supermarket shelves
across the world. Some countries stepped up inspections for Chinese imports, while oth-
ers issued explicit import bans for products containing dairy ingredients from China. For
instance, EU authorities imposed tests on Chinese imports containing more than 15% of
milk powder and announced a ban on all Chinese products containing milk for children; the
9In addition to the three big rounds of inspections targeting downstream dairy firms, the Chinese gov-
ernment conducted checks at upstream facilities and shut down a number of milk stations. We do not have





US Food and Drug Administration restricted imports of all Chinese food products contain-
ing milk; India imposed an import ban on milk and all milk-related products from China
that was extended until 2019. Our news search identified 43 destinations (out of 157) that
imposed explicit regulatory bans on certain Chinese dairy imports (Table B.1).
The scandal had a long-lasting impact on the dairy industry in China. The GAQSIQ
stopped issuing national exemption status to domestic food producers11 and tightened in-
spections on domestically produced food products. Dairy firms also tightened their standards
for purchased raw milk, and some started their own upstream milk farms to better control
quality. However, Figure 1 shows that despite these actions, dairy exports sharply declined
after 2008 and had not recovered by the end of 2013, the end of our sample period. At
the same time, dairy imports in China rose rapidly after the scandal (Figure A.2), suggest-
ing that domestic consumers also switched to foreign dairy products in response to safety
concerns about domestic producers.
3 Data
We merge three micro-level data sets: the Chinese Customs Database, the Chinese Manu-
facturing Survey, and the list of inspections conducted by the Chinese government.
3.1 Chinese Customs Database (2000-2013)
The Chinese Customs Database provides information on trade flows for the universe of
China’s exports and imports. We focus on exports for this study. We observe the exporting
firm’s name, location, export value, and export quantity, the HS eight-digit product code,
the city in China from which the product is sourced, and the final export destination. We
compute unit prices for exported products by dividing the value of export by the quantity.
11This policy was previously known as the “inspection-free” program, which gave exemption status to
qualified food producers and waived various quality inspections for these firms.
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For our industry-level analysis in Section 4, we aggregate the data to the HS two-digit
industry-year level; for our spillover analysis in Sections 5 and 6, we aggregate the data to
the firm-product-year level.12 Figure A.3 shows that China’s overall exports grew rapidly in
the early 2000s following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
We define the dairy industry using the HS eight-digit product classification. Most dairy
products fall under the HS two-digit code 04, while infant dairy products fall under 19 and
milk protein products extracted from raw milk fall under 35. Table B.2 provides the full list
of the HS eight-digit codes and descriptions for dairy products.
3.2 Chinese Manufacturing Survey (2005-2009, 2011-2013)
The Chinese Manufacturing Survey data are compiled from annual surveys conducted by
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and include all state-owned and non-state-owned
industrial firms with sales revenue above 5 million RMB. Even though a large number of
small to medium-size industrial firms (80%) are excluded from the sample, they account for
only a small fraction of the total economic and export activities in China. In particular, the
excluded firms employ 28.8% of the industrial workforce but produce only 9.3% of the total
output and generate 2.5% of the export revenue (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012).
Our spillover analysis in Sections 5.2 and 6.3 focuses on dairy firms within the manufacturing
sector. For each firm-year, we observe production and financial information, including firms’
four-digit industry code, years of operation, total sales, employment, and export revenue.
When export revenue is missing, we complement the observation using the Customs data:
we follow the standard procedure for matching firms across the Manufacturing Survey and
the Customs data using name and address information.13
12For observations from years prior to 2006, the data include exact the export date. For years after 2007,
only monthly data are available. We collapse the data to the year level to account for monthly seasonality
in exports.
13This matching is not 100% accurate, as documented in the literature (e.g., Kee and Tang (2016)). Of
the 335 dairy firms appearing in the Customs data in 2007, we can identify 151 in the Manufacturing Survey.
The lack of matches for the remaining 184 firms could be due to mismatches in firm names or the fact that
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3.3 Government Inspection Lists
Section 2 describes the three rounds of inspections implemented by the Chinese government
after the scandal. For each round, the government released the list of products inspected at
each firm and the inspection results. We obtained the inspection lists (at the firm-product
level) from the GAQSIQ website. To cross-validate the information in the official reports,
we conducted an extensive news search through LexisNexis: all the media-reported cases of
contamination that we found appeared in the official inspection lists.
We merge the firm-product-level inspection lists with the Customs data using firm names
and product information and with the Manufacturing Survey data using firm names (since the
latter data do not include product information). We classify merged firms into one of three
categories: contaminated, innocent, and uninspected. Contaminated firms have at least one
product found to be contaminated during one or more rounds of inspections. Innocent firms
passed the tests for all of their inspected products. Uninspected firms were never inspected.
We analogously classify products into the following categories: contaminated products are
those found to be contaminated in at least one of the inspected firms, and innocent products
are those that cleared inspection in all firms inspected.
3.4 Summary Statistics
Our spillover analysis in Section 5 uses two samples. First, we use our linked Customs-
Inspections sample to study the scandal’s spillover effects on the export performance of
dairy firms at the firm-product level. This sample includes 1,868 firm-products across 1,464
firms and 25 products. Of these, we identify 149 contaminated firm-product pairs in 67
contaminated firms and 413 innocent firm-product pairs in 95 innocent firms. Second, we
use our linked Manufacturing Survey-Inspections sample to study the scandal’s spillover
effects on the domestic performance of the dairy firms. This sample includes 1,687 firms, 73
the Manufacturing Survey includes only above-scale firms.
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of which were contaminated and 352 innocent. Restricting the sample to firms that appear
in the Manufacturing Survey both before and after the scandal reduces the sample to 238
firms: 19 contaminated and 103 innocent.
Table 1 presents firm-level baseline (2000-2007) summary statistics for export perfor-
mance measures in the linked Customs-Inspections sample (Panel A) and for employment
and total sales in the Manufacturing Survey-Inspections sample (Panel B). It compares con-
taminated (Columns 1-2), innocent (Columns 3-4), and uninspected firms (Columns 5-6).
Column 7 calculates the difference in means between contaminated and uninspected firms
(Columns 2 and 6), and Column 8 reports the p-value of this difference. On average, con-
taminated firms have larger export revenue and are more experienced than innocent firms;
however, they are not systematically different from uninspected firms (Panel A). Contami-
nated firms are larger in terms of both employment and sales revenue than both innocent
firms and uninspected firms (Panel B). This pattern is consistent with the Chinese govern-
ment targeting larger firms in the third round of inspection.14 Even for the second round
of inspections, which were claimed to be random, inspected firms appear to differ from
uninspected firms on several observable characteristics, including the value of exports in
2007 (Table A.2). Section 5 discusses how our empirical framework addresses selection into
inspection.
Table 2 presents product-level baseline summary statistics for the same export perfor-
mance measures in the Customs-Inspections sample for dairy (Panel A) and non-dairy (Panel
B) products. On average, contaminated products are exported in larger quantities and for
longer export periods than innocent and uninspected products. Contaminated products
also appear to be less likely to be exported to countries in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) although the difference is not significant.
Figure A.4 plots the number of export products and destinations for contaminated, in-
nocent, and uninspected firms before and after the scandal. Many firms exported a single
14Table A.1 shows similar patterns for firms producing non-dairy food products.
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product to a single destination. In Section 5, we discuss how these patterns generate the
variation that we exploit for the firm-product-level analysis.
4 Impact of the Scandal: Industry-Level Analysis
This section estimates the overall impact of the scandal on the export performance of the
Chinese dairy sector. Section 4.1 discusses our preferred empirical specification, a difference-
in-differences (DD) specification, as well as threats to the validity of the DD assumptions
and additional tests we perform that relax these assumptions. Section 4.2 presents our DD
estimates. Our finding that the scandal decreased the total value of dairy exports by 68%
over the course of five years motivates us to further explore within-sector spillovers across
firms and products in Section 5.
4.1 Empirical Specification
Equation (1) presents our baseline DD specification, which compares the value of exports
of the dairy industry (the treated industry) to the value of exports of other two-digit-level
industries before and after 2008, the year of the scandal.
Yjt = βdairyDairyj × Postt + γj + δt + πXjt + εjt (1)
Yjt is the natural logarithm of the value of exports for industry j in year t; Dairyj is an
indicator for the dairy industry; and Xjt includes time-varying controls at the industry level,
such as the value share exported to different continents at baseline (2000-2007) interacted
with year indicators. These covariates control for differential trends in destination countries
that may affect different industries differently. In our preferred specification, we include 79
non-food control industries. Non-dairy food exports may also be affected by the scandal if
foreign consumers update their perceptions about the quality of Chinese food products in
general. We cluster standard errors at the industry level, allowing for arbitrary correlation
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in error terms across time for a given industry.
The internal validity of the DD design rests on the assumption that the treated and
control industries would be on parallel trends absent the scandal. This parallel trends as-
sumption may not hold in our context for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section 2, prior
to the scandal, dairy exports grew rapidly, a growth episode that might not be paralleled
in other industries. Second, the global financial crisis in 2008 could have affected different
industries differently. If so, we may erroneously attribute to the scandal an export decline in
dairy products that was in fact due to the crisis. While perfectly overcoming these concerns
is challenging in the current context, we perform a series of robustness checks, detailed in
Appendix C. Our estimates of the impact of the scandal are robust to several specifications
that relax the parallel trends assumption, such as including a vector of industry-specific
linear time trends. Moreover, an interactive fixed effect model (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016)
and a synthetic control model produce qualitatively and quantitatively similar estimates to
those produced by the DD design, despite relying on different identification assumptions.
4.2 Results: Difference-in-Differences
Table 3 presents estimates of Equation (1). We focus first on Panel A. The baseline spec-
ification in Column 1 includes only year and industry fixed effects and estimates a decline
of 65.5% in the value of dairy exports following the scandal.15 Columns 3 and 4 build on
this specification by adding time-varying controls and industry-specific linear trends. Our
preferred specification in Column 4 estimates that the value of dairy exports plummeted
by 68% following the scandal. Column 2 expands our sample to include non-dairy food
industries. The coefficient on the interaction between the food-industry indicator and the
post-scandal indicator suggests that the scandal did not affect the non-dairy food industry
in an economically and statistically significant way.
15Because most of the coefficients that we estimate are large in magnitude, we compute elasticities using
the following formula: Elasticity = (eCoeff −1)×100, where Coeff is the estimated coefficient reported in the
tables.
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Panel A estimates the overall impact of the scandal on the dairy industry, capturing both
the direct impact on contaminated firm-products and the spillovers to innocent and unin-
spected firms and products. Panel B disentangles the aggregate spillover effect by excluding
contaminated firm-products from the treated (dairy) industry. We estimate a 57% decrease
in exports for innocent and uninspected firm-products, about four-fifths of the total effect of
the scandal.16 The difference between the spillover and the total effect is only statistically
significant in our preferred specification in Column 4.
5 Reputation Spillover: Firm-Product-Level Analysis
Motivated by the findings in the previous section, we examine how the impact of the scandal
spilled over across firms and products within the dairy sector. We study both the direct
impact on contaminated firm-products and the spillover effects within and across firms in the
industry. To do so, we use our Customs-Inspection sample described in Section 3 to exploit
within-industry variation in involvement in the scandal. Our main regression specification is
as follows:
Yfpt = βdirectCFirm-Productfp × Postt
+ βwithin-firmCFirmf × Postt
+ βacross-firmCProductp × Postt
+ λ1IFirm-Productfp × Postt
+ λ2IFirmf × Postt
+ γfp + δt + εfpt (2)
We restrict the analysis to the dairy industry. The dependent variable Yfpt is an outcome
16An analogous analysis shows that dairy imports significantly increased relative to imports in other sectors
after 2008 (Table A.3) as domestic consumers switched to foreign brands following the crisis.
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for firm f ’s product p in year t, including the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation
of export revenue and export quantity, the natural logarithm of export price, and an in-
dicator for exporting.17 Except for the price outcome, we first create a balanced panel at
the firm-product and year levels to capture extensive-margin responses (i.e., entry and exit
into export). CFirm-Productfp is an indicator for contaminated firm-product pairs directly
involved in the scandal: the indicator equals 1 if a given product of a firm was inspected
and failed the quality test. CFirmf is an indicator for contaminated firms: the indicator
equals 1 if a firm was inspected and at least one of its products failed the test. CProductp
is an indicator for contaminated products: the indicator equals 1 if at least one of the in-
spected firms failed the quality test for the given product. IFirm-Productfp and IFirmf are
defined similarly: IFirm-Productfp is an indicator for innocent firm-product pairs that were
inspected and passed the quality test. IFirmf is an indicator for innocent firms that passed
the quality test for all of their inspected products.
Identification relies on the assumption that unobserved firm-product-year-specific shocks
that affect the outcomes are uncorrelated with the initial inspection status. In other words,
absent the scandal, all firm-products would have seen the same growth in export performance
over time. However, the Chinese government did not choose which firms to inspect randomly.
As discussed in Section 3.4, inspected firms are on average larger than uninspected firms.
To assuage concerns of omitted variable or selection bias, our preferred specification in-
cludes 1) firm-product (γfp) and 2) year (δt) fixed effects as well as 3) an interaction of
baseline firm-product export volume with the post-scandal indicator. First, this specifica-
tion partials out time-invariant firm-product unobservable characteristics, such as quality.
Second, it controls for common nationwide dairy industry time trends, such as global de-
mand shocks. Third, differential trends for firms of different sizes account for potentially
different growth trajectories during the dairy boom prior to the scandal. Thus, our analysis
17We use the IHS transformation for export revenues and quantity to obviate the fact that we have missing
firm-product-year cells when exports are zero (Burbidge, Magee, and Robb, 1988).
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captures differential changes in performance across firm-products over time. To examine the
sensitivity of our results, we also estimate an alternative specification including firm, product
and year fixed effects separately (Table A.4). We cluster standard errors two ways at the
product-year and firm level, allowing for arbitrary correlation in error terms over time for
a given firm and across firms for a given product-year. This two-way clustering allows for
persistent shocks within a firm over time as well as for cross-sectional yearly shocks affecting
all firms producing the same products.
The omitted category in Equation 2 includes innocent products and uninspected prod-
ucts from uninspected firms. Therefore, βacross-firm identifies the impact of the scandal on
uninspected firms selling one of the products found to be contaminated in other firms (i.e.,
cross-firm spillovers). βwithin-firm identifies the overall impact on the contaminated firms (i.e.,
within-firm spillovers), whereas βdirect captures the additional impact on their directly in-
volved products. Similarly, λ1 and λ2 capture the impact on innocent firms and innocent
firm-products relative to the omitted group. Given that the regression is done at the firm-
product-year level, Table A.5 presents an overview of the variation in the data by counting
the number of observations falling under different cells, namely, contaminated versus non-
contaminated firms and products before and after the scandal.
We present our baseline estimation results in Section 5.1 and discuss their interpretation
in Section 5.2 as well as alternative explanations and robustness checks in Section 5.3.
5.1 Results: Direct and Spillover Effects on Exports
Table 4 reports the main estimates from Equation (2). Column 1 examines the impact of the
scandal on the IHS of export revenue and shows large within-firm and cross-firm spillovers.
Specifically, we estimate β̂within-firm = −1.8, which is significant at the 1% level; that is,
contaminated firms experienced a drop of 84.1% in export revenue after the scandal relative to
the national trend and the firms’ average performance. Within contaminated firms, directly
involved products were affected more–the estimated coefficient βdirect is meaningful (-0.489,
17
or -38.7%) but imprecisely estimated, suggesting that there may be heterogeneous impacts
among directly contaminated firm-products. Another possibility is that since most products
within the contaminated firms were affected, the coefficient is only picking up any differential
impact of contaminated versus innocent and uninspected products within those firms.
In line with the industry-level analysis in Section 4, we also see a large negative spillover
effect on firms selling contaminated products: the estimate for βacross-firm is -0.773 (or -53.8%)
and is significant at the 1% level. Finally, the effects on innocent firms and products are
mixed: while the coefficient on IFirm-Product×Post is large and positive, the overall impact
on innocent firms, relative to uninspected firms, is negative. Neither of these estimates is
statistically significant.
Column 2 examines the effects of the scandal on the IHS of export quantity and finds
similar results. Comparing the estimates of βacross-firm in Columns 1 and 2, the decrease
in quantity explains 97.9% of the cross-firm spillovers, after entry and exit are taken into
account.
Column 3 examines changes in unit price on the unbalanced panel of firm-product-year
observations with positive export activity. The estimate of βacross-firm is -0.157 (-14.5%) and
is significant at the 10% level. The direct impact on contaminated firm-products is -0.122
(-11.5%) but is not statistically significant, whereas the within-firm spillover β̂within-firm is
positive at 0.209 (18.9%) with a standard error of 0.051. One possible explanation for this
positive within-firm price coefficient is that contaminated firms disproportionately raised
the prices of their non-contaminated products to make up for lost revenue. Alternatively,
contaminated firms may have incurred larger cost shocks (for example, costs of recalling
products or clearing government inspections) than non-contaminated firms and partially
passed those costs through to final consumers. The estimated βwithin-firm captures the net of
these additional spillover effects in addition to potential reputation spillovers.
Column 4 examines the impact of the scandal on the extensive margin and finds that con-
taminated firms are 14.2% less likely to export after the scandal. The estimate for βwithin-firm
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is significant at the 1% level, whereas the one for βdirect is indistinguishable from 0. All
Chinese dairy firms carrying products found to have been contaminated during the scandal,
regardless of whether the firms themselves are innocent, contaminated or not inspected, are
6.2% less likely to export those products, and the estimate of βacross-firm is significant at the
1% level. The results on innocent firms and products are again inconclusive.
We examine how persistent the direct and spillover effects are by fully interacting the firm-
product group dummies in Equation (2) with year dummies. Figure 2 plots the regression
coefficients with 95% confidence intervals for two outcome variables: log value of exports
and exporting indicator. Both the within-firm and cross-firm spillover effects persist more
than five years after the scandal and display little sign of recovery.
Our findings contrast with estimates of reputation spillover effects in developed countries.
For example, Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman (2012) and Bachmann, Ehrlich, Fan, and
Ruzic (2019) document cross-firm reputation spillover effects for US and German manufac-
turers, respectively, that are much smaller than what we estimate for Chinese dairy firms.
This difference in magnitude suggests that information frictions may be larger in develop-
ing countries.18 Mistrust of government agencies in developing countries may make it more
difficult for firms to recover from damages to collective reputation. More work is needed to
draw systematic comparisons across different countries and market environments.
5.2 Interpretation: The Role of Government Inspections
We find large cross-firm spillovers in export performance, including for uninspected firms.
However, we find mixed evidence of reputation spillovers to innocent firms and products.
These findings highlight the potential challenges of government inspection efforts in helping
firms signal quality. First, the public may perceive government inspections to be a negative
18Specifically, Bachmann, Ehrlich, Fan, and Ruzic (2019) finds that other German auto manufacturers
experienced a 9.2 percentage point reduction in sales growth rate from 2015 to 2016 following the VW
scandal. Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman (2012) finds that sales revenue during the Christmas holiday
season declined by 30% for unaffected toy manufacturers in the US after a related scandal.
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signal. Being inspected may have been taken to indicate that something was not right (“bad
signaling effect”), even though some inspections were allegedly targeted at random. Second,
being mentioned in news reports on the scandal may impose a stigma if customers do not pay
attention to the details of the news. Ma, Wang, and Khanna (2016) discuss this “reminder
(salience) effect”.
Both the bad signaling and reminder effects may also be present in the domestic market,
potentially making government inspections ineffective. Figure A.2 and Table A.3 show that
the scandal increased imports, suggesting mistrust of domestic brands. To shed light on
domestic spillover effects, we turn to the Manufacturing Survey data, which are only available
at the firm level. We restrict the analysis to a balanced sample of firms to account for survey
composition changes.19 In total, 238 dairy firms appeared in all years between 2005-2009
and 2011-2013, out of 1,687 that ever appeared during this period. These firms account for
49.8% of the total dairy production during this period.
Table 5 estimates the impact of the scandal on this sample of continuing firms. We
cluster standard errors at the firm level, as product-level information is not available in this
sample. The coefficients are not precisely estimated. Qualitatively, we see a negative impact
of the scandal on contaminated firms, while innocent firms do not appear to perform better
than uninspected ones. These findings are consistent with the bad signaling and reminder
effects acting on the domestic market and highlight the challenges that governments may face
in restoring trust. These results speak to the importance of understanding how consumers
acquire information. We come back to this point in Section 6 when we discuss the mechanisms
underlying the reputation spillover.
19Section 3.2 explains that the Manufacturing Survey only includes firms with sales revenue exceeding 5
million RMB. Thus, we cannot distinguish between true exits due to the scandal versus mere reductions in
scale.
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5.3 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
This section considers several alternative explanations aside from reputation spillovers that
may contribute to the results in Section 5.1 and presents additional robustness checks.
5.3.1 Differential Time Trends
Different subindustries within the dairy sector may have followed different growth trajectories
in the absence of the scandal, leading to biased estimates of the spillover effects. Table A.4
allows for differential time trends across subindustries at the HS two-digit level. Reassuringly,
these results are qualitatively very similar to the results in Table 4.
Reversion to the mean could also bias our results. If contaminated firms were growing
faster prior to the scandal, our estimates may be partly driven by these fast-growing firms
mechanically scaling down their production and reducing exports after the scandal. To
alleviate this concern, we allow for differential time trends with respect to baseline sales in
our baseline specification. In Table A.6, we further exclude firms and destination countries
that account for most of the export growth spike between 2006 and 2008 (see the discussion
in Section 2). The results are very similar.20
5.3.2 Confounding Supply-Side Factors
Collective reputation represents a demand-side force, but supply-side forces may also have
contributed to the observed spillover effects. For example, the scandal disrupted the activities
of some upstream suppliers: some milk farmers and milk stations exited the market as
a result. Similarly, stronger government regulations may have imposed additional costs on
firms, raising their production costs. All these supply-side forces could have led to reductions
in export revenue and quantity. However, a pure upward shift of the supply curve would
have resulted in an unambiguous increase in price (conditional on exporting), contrary to
20As discussed in Section 2, a few predominant firms and export destinations drove the growth spike in
the pre-scandal period (2006-2007).
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what we estimate in Table 4, Column 3: the coefficient on CProductXPost, the key collective
reputation spillover effect, is negative and significant at the 10% level.21 This result alone
implies that the demand curve must have moved downward and offset the supply curve
movement. While we cannot completely rule out supply-side movements, we conclude that
the demand-side force due to collective reputation effects played an important role in this
context.
5.3.3 Confounding Foreign Demand Shocks
Different firms may be subject to idiosyncratic demand shocks depending on the conditions
in the destination countries that they export to. If contaminated firms were more likely to
export to countries that happened to demand more or fewer imported dairy products after
2008, the estimated coefficients would be biased. To examine this possibility, we construct
a measure of firm-specific demand shocks using a firm’s baseline export value share for each
destination country multiplied by each destination country’s yearly dairy imports from the
rest of the world excluding China and summed over all destinations. Table A.4 shows that
our results are robust to including these firm-specific demand shocks as additional controls.
5.3.4 Foreign Import Regulations Due to Protectionist Motives
Import regulations targeted at all firms from the same origin-industry can result in pat-
terns similar to those estimated in Table 4. Table B.1 lists the 20 countries plus the EU
that imposed explicit import bans on Chinese dairy products after the 2008 scandal by the
countries’ value share in total dairy exports from China.
One way to think about such trade policies is that foreign governments react on behalf of
domestic consumers in light of rising safety concerns about products imported from a par-
ticular country. Such blanket regulations represent an underlying channel for the collective
21We can estimate the price regression on a balanced sample of exporters (i.e., firms that exported both
before and after the scandal) to account for any sample composition change; the results are robust.
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reputation effect. Alternatively, these regulations may arise from protectionist motives. In
other words, foreign countries could take advantage of the scandal to raise import barriers.
Empirically distinguishing these two stories is challenging. Table A.7 presents estimates only
for the sample of destinations without explicit import bans. These results are very similar
to our main estimates, suggesting that explicit government regulations cannot fully explain
the spillover effects. Market-based forces due to collective reputation do matter.
6 Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate three potential mechanisms that may mediate the strength
of the reputation spillover effects documented in Sections 4 and 5. Since a firm’s repu-
tation consists essentially of buyers’ beliefs, how consumers gather information and learn
matters crucially for reputation externalities. Thus, the mechanisms that we investigate
relate to what may shape consumers’ information sets. Specifically, we examine the roles of
1) information accuracy in global media reports, 2) firms’ location and the traceability of
contaminated suppliers, and 3) firms’ export experience. All of these forces can act jointly
and interact with one another. Rather than trying to disentangle and quantify the impact
of each, our goal is to examine whether a particular force has bite.
6.1 Information Accuracy in Global Media Reports
A large literature has shown that the media influence people’s perceptions, thereby affecting
a wide range of social and economic outcomes (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). In the
context of food scares, Adda (2007) and Luong, Shi, and Wang (2019) show that news in-
formation alters consumers’ perceived risk of encountering low-quality products and thereby
affects demand. Therefore, how the media report an event shapes the event’s impacts. We
investigate an important aspect of media reports on the scandal: informational accuracy,
that is, the level of detail with which media outlets described the involvement of different
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firms in the scandal. Figure A.5 shows a typical Chinese media report on the scandal (left
panel), which includes a full list of contaminated firms and products, and an example from
the Western media, the New York Times (right panel), which only reported an estimated
number of contaminated firms without mentioning any specific names.
Such heterogeneity in media reports across countries can generate different information
sets among local consumers. We can imagine two scenarios: one in which consumers perfectly
understand the evolution of the scandal and are able to closely keep track of the inspection
outcomes and another in which consumers have trouble identifying the contaminated firms
and worry about Chinese dairy products in general as a result of the scandal. Collective
reputation forces would be stronger in the latter scenario than in the former.
To construct a systematic measure of consumers’ information accuracy across different
export destinations, we leverage Google Trends data. Google Trends provides public time
series indices based on Google Search data, which capture how often a search term is entered
relative to the total search volume in a given geographical area. To allow comparisons of
relative popularity across search terms, each data point in Google Trends indices is divided
by the total searches in the corresponding geographical area and time range and scaled on a
range of 0 to 100 for any given period. We collect data for 31 countries available on Google
Trends and construct the relative search intensity ratio for two keywords—“Sanlu” versus
“2008 Chinese milk scandal”—for each country. Figure 3 displays the relative search intensity
across countries. Web users in Japan, China, Hong Kong, and New Zealand, for example,
searched for “Sanlu” much more than the generic phrase, suggesting that consumers in these
locations may have been more informed about the parties directly involved in the scandal.
In comparison, the searched information appears to have been much less specific in countries
such as Myanmar, Pakistan, Austria, and Vietnam.22 We classify countries into two groups
based on the relative search intensity: high indicates a higher ratio (top quartile) and thus
22Figure A.6 shows the search behavior across provinces in China. Not surprisingly, Hebei province, where
the headquarters of Sanlu was located, has the highest search intensity for the keyword “Sanlu”.
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higher information accuracy (Figure 3).23
Table 6 reports the effect of the scandal on export performance to destinations with high
and low search intensity ratios. Consistent with consumers in countries with low informa-
tion accuracy not being able to distinguish innocent and contaminated firms, the cross-firm
spillover effect (β̂across-firm) is driven by exports to destinations with low information accu-
racy (-0.639 compared to -0.025, with a p-value for testing equality of 0.0016). In Table
A.8, we further divide countries into quartiles of the information accuracy measure. We find
suggestive evidence of bigger cross-firm spillover effects as information worsens.
Overall, these results show that information accuracy plays an important role in medi-
ating the force of collective reputation. Information accuracy may be particularly relevant
in the context of international trade, as media coverage of events that happen in foreign
countries, where information needs to travel far, may be less precise.
6.2 Firms’ Sourcing Location
Next, we investigate how firms’ location mediates the strength of reputation spillovers. In
the case of the Chinese dairy scandal, contamination stemmed from wrongdoings in the
upstream sector, as discussed in Section 2. Given that dairy firms from the same location
tend to source inputs from the same local upstream farms, one may expect to see stronger
spillover effects on innocent and uninspected firms located in the same areas as contaminated
firms.24 To examine this aspect, we take advantage of the Chinese Customs data, in which
23This measure of information accuracy may be correlated with countries’ baseline market share of Chi-
nese dairy exports, potentially confounding the estimation results. Regressing the Google search index on
countries’ baseline market share yields a low R-square of 0.007 (0.005), suggesting that most variation in
information accuracy cannot be explained by market share. One factor affecting information accuracy could
be how the scandal was covered in the local media, which may depend on political attitudes.
24In general, the source of contamination and the public’s knowledge of this information matter for the
degree of reputation spillovers. If the root cause of a quality defect is limited to a well-known individual firm,
consumers may not be concerned about other firms in the same origin-industry. One example of a defect
that involved a single firm only is the case of the Samsung Galaxy battery fire, the aftermath of which did
not affect any other South Korean phone brands. By contrast, if the quality defect stems from upstream
production processes, as was the case in the Chinese dairy scandal, all downstream firms may suffer from
reputation spillover effects, especially if inputs are hard to trace. A scandal about the product quality of one
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firms are required to report the sourcing location for each of their export transactions. We
leverage this information to identify whether a city hosts any contaminated firms for a given
product; if so, we call it a “contaminated city”. We define an indicator variable CSourceCity
for firm i that equals 1 if i sourced (any product) from a contaminated city prior to the
scandal. We define another indicator variable CSourceCity-Product that equals to 1 if i ever
sourced contaminated product j from the same city as a contaminated firm. We interact
these indicator variables with the post-Scandal indicator to study how baseline sourcing
patterns affected firms’ post-scandal export performance.
Table 7 reports the impact of sourcing from a contaminated location for innocent and
uninspected firms. While we estimate large overall cross-firm spillovers (the negative coeffi-
cient on CProductXPost), the exact sourcing location of a firm does not appear to matter:
the point estimates on the two additional interaction terms are very close to zero, though
the standard errors are fairly large. The result suggests that the spillover effects were gen-
eralized rather than contained around contaminated sources. One potential explanation is
that international buyers may have very coarse information about contamination sources
due to the low traceability of the contaminated inputs; as a result, the spillover effects are
not localized. This echoes our previous findings that information accuracy matters for the
strength of reputation spillover effects. Moreover, to the extent that firms in one location
compete for the same labor and upstream supplier inputs, innocent and uninspected firms
may have benefited when their rivals were hit by the scandal. The estimated coefficients
thus reflect the net of the reputation and competition effects.
6.3 Firms’ Export Experience
A firm’s reputation can have both an individual component and a collective component: for
example, consumers may observe a quality signal from each firm as well as a noisy signal
firm may cause consumers to worry about the quality of other firms that source from the same upstream
sources.
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of the industry’s average quality. In this case, a strong individual reputation may mitigate
the impact of a collective reputation shock. To examine this possibility, we proxy a firm’s
individual reputation in the global market by its export experience, measured by the number
of years the firm had been exporting prior to the scandal and the firm’s baseline share of
exports in total sales.
Table 8 shows the heterogeneous impact of the scandal based on export experience. Due
to our short baseline period, we define new (young) firms as those that had just started ex-
porting in 2008 and established firms as those that had exported for one or more years prior
to 2008. Consistent with individual reputation shielding a firm from collective reputation
shocks, the cross-firm spillover effect is larger for new exporters. Here, too, we allow for
differential time trends with respect to firm size, which is likely to differ between new and
established exporters. A test of equality of β̂across-firm in Columns 1-2 (or Columns 3-4) has
a p-value of 0.0191 (or 0.0734). The test of equality of the spillover effects on the extensive
margin, β̂across-firm in Columns 5-6 (or Columns 7-8), has a p-value of 0.0335 (or 0.1313).
These findings suggest that in light of a collective reputation shock, a more established indi-
vidual reputation can (partially) shield firms from the collective damage, whereas newcomers
are more likely to suffer from the “original sin” of their predecessors.
Table A.9 explores an alternative measure of export experience based on firms’ fraction
of exports in total sales in 2007. For this exercise, we merge the Chinese Customs data with
the Manufacturing Survey data and use the total sales information in the latter. Of the 335
dairy firms in the Chinese Customs sample in 2007, 151 are identified in the Manufacturing
Survey. The relatively low match rate could be due to the imperfect matching of firms’
names and addresses across the Manufacturing Survey and the Chinese Customs data or the
fact that the Manufacturing Survey only includes above-scale firms (see Section 3.2). Figure
A.7 plots the distribution of the fraction of exports in total sales in the baseline year. On
average, conditional on exporting, exports account for 10.3% of the firms’ total sales (the
median is 9.8%) with a standard deviation of 0.35. We classify firms as large exporters if
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their fraction of exports exceeds the median and small otherwise. The results again suggest
that small firms tend to suffer more from collective reputation damage.
Summary: This section explores three mechanisms potentially driving collective reputa-
tion spillover effects. First, information accuracy plays an important role in mediating the
strength of collective reputation—the spillover effects are smaller in destinations where peo-
ple appear to have had better information about the parties involved in the scandal. Second,
the spillover effects appear to be generalized rather than localized to contaminated sources,
consistent with international buyers having coarse information about contamination sources
due to low traceability of the contaminated inputs. Finally, individual reputation can miti-
gate collective reputation damage, and new exporters and firms with larger baseline export
shares appear to be the most vulnerable to collective reputation shocks.
7 Conclusion
Understanding how reputation spreads within an industry or a geographic area is key for
informing trade and development policy, as the existence of collective reputation implies
important externalities. We study this question in the context of Chinese dairy firms’ exports
following the 2008 scandal. We document strong reputation spillover effects on firms whose
products were not contaminated. Surprisingly, firms that cleared formal inspections do not
appear to have fared any better than uninspected firms. These findings highlight the role
of collective reputation in international trade and the challenges that governments may face
in signaling quality and restoring trust. Analyses of potential mechanisms highlight the
role of information accuracy, supply chain traceability and firms’ individual reputations in
mediating the collective reputation effect.
Our study has two broad policy implications concerning 1) the role of government and
third-party certifications and 2) the role of market structure. That said, the external validity
of the results is an empirical question, as the exact magnitudes of spillovers vary across
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industries and countries and depend on whether directly affected firms are large industry
leaders or small players. Our approach can be applied to other contexts.
First, collective reputation may call for government interventions, but government-led
inspection efforts may generate counterproductive signals, depending on the reputation of the
inspection body itself. Private third parties and international certification bodies may act as
an effective complement to or substitute for government regulations, especially in developing-
country settings. However, based on our interviews with firms in the Chinese dairy industry,
third-party certification has not been adopted in this sector. This could be due either to
high costs or logistical hurdles in obtaining these certifications or to perceived low returns
to certification. Understanding the barriers to adoption as well as the effectiveness of these
programs is crucial for designing policies that could assure a high quality standard and break
the low-quality-low-reputation equilibrium.
Second, this study takes a first step in investigating various mechanisms that may affect
the transmission of reputation spillovers. Understanding these mechanisms can help inform
policies in response to a collective reputation crisis. Following the milk scandal, many firms
integrated vertically with upstream farms. One rationale for vertical integration is the ability
to enforce stronger quality controls (Hansman, Hjort, León, and Teachout, 2017); an equally
important rationale is to signal quality, so that a firm is better shielded from wrongdoing
by other firms’ suppliers. It is expected that by 2020, over 70% of Chinese raw milk will be
produced from vertically integrated milk farms.25 Future work is needed to better understand
how collective reputation affects firms’ quality investment incentives. Acting as an important
externality, collective reputation could also have rich interactions with other market forces,
such as market entry and competition.
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Notes: This figure plots Chinese dairy export values and quantities from 2000 to 2013.
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Notes: This figure plots the regression coefficients of the following three group dummies interacted with year dummies:
ContaminatedFirm-Product, ContaminatedFirm and ContaminatedProduct. The same regressions also include the interaction
terms between year dummies and InnocentFirm-Product as well as InnocentFirm dummies; these coefficients are not plotted.
The outcome variable for the left column is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of export value, and the one for
the right column is the export dummy. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. The dotted lines plot the
95% confidence intervals, based on two-way clustered standard errors at the firm and product-year level.
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Figure 3: Ratio of Google Search Index: “Sanlu” versus “2008 Chinese Milk Scandal”
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the Google search index for the keyword “Sanlu” versus “2008 Chinese milk scandal”
by country between 09/01/2008 and 10/31/2008. The orange bars mark countries with high information accuracy (the top
quartile), while the green ones mark countries with low information accuracy.
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Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics: Dairy Firms
Contaminated Innocent Uninspected Contaminated vs. Uninspected
Number Mean Number Mean Number Mean Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Customs Database
Avg. yearly export revenue 15 3.30 23 .50 960 1.85 1.45 .349
(in million dollars) . (6.15) . (.91) . (6.62) (1.55) .
Years of exporting 15 4.80 23 3.22 960 4.22 .58 .421
. (2.86) . (2.32) . (2.43) (.72) .
% exports to OECD countries 15 .49 23 .39 960 .60 -.11 .299
(conditioning on exporting) . (.43) . (.42) . (.39) (.11) .
Panel B. Manufacturing Survey
Employment 38 955 284 280 1407 177 778 .002
. (1573) . (451) . (294) (252) .
Log (employment) 38 5.73 284 5.04 1393 4.55 1.18 0
. (1.45) . (.94) . (1.05) (.23) .
Sales revenue (in million RMB) 36 982 264 112 880 73 909 .008
. (2074) . (235) . (165) (341) .
Log (sales revenue) 36 5.05 263 3.71 867 3.14 1.91 0
. (2.01) . (1.28) . (1.45) (.33) .
Notes: For each firm, the sample includes only dairy products. Panel A uses the baseline (2000-2007) Customs database linked with the inspection list to
identify contaminated, innocent and uninspected firms. Panel B uses the baseline (2005-2007) Manufacturing Survey data, also linked with the inspection
list. The unit of observation is collapsed to the firm level. Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the number of firms in each category. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show the mean
of selected variables in each subsample. For these variables, Column 7 calculates the difference between contaminated firms (Column 2) and uninspected
firms (Column 6), obtained by regressing the outcome variable on a contaminated group dummy. Column 8 presents the p-value of the difference. Standard
deviations are in parentheses for Columns 2, 4 and 6. For Column 7, robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Baseline Summary Statistics: Dairy and Dairy-related Products
Contaminated Innocent+Uninspected
Number Mean Number Mean Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dairy Products
Avg. yearly export revenue 11 6.36 12 3.99 2.37 .542
(in million dollars) . (11.12) . (6.41) (3.83) .
Number of exporting years 11 7.64 12 6.42 1.22 .086
. (1.21) . (1.98) (.68) .
% to OECD countries 11 .55 12 .65 -.10 .437
. (.25) . (.33) (.12) .
Panel B. Non-dairy Food Products
Avg. yearly export revenue 16 38.53 944 21.23 17.30 .168
(in million dollars) . (51.01) . (67.02) (12.55) .
Number of exporting years 16 7.88 944 6.09 1.79 0
. (.50) . (2.51) (.15) .
% to OECD countries 16 .80 944 .76 .04 .204
. (.13) . (.26) (.03) .
Notes: The sample is obtained from the baseline (2000-2007) Customs database linked with the inspection list to identify
contaminated, innocent and uninspected products. Panel A only includes dairy products, while Panel B includes non-
dairy food products. The unit of observation is collapsed to the product (HS eight-digit) level. Columns 1 and 3 show
the number of products (HS eight-digit) in each category. Columns 2 and 4 show the mean of selected variables in each
subsample. Column 5 calculates the difference between contaminated products (Column 2) and innocent plus uninspected
products (Column 4), obtained by regressing the outcome variable on a contaminated group dummy. Column 6 presents
the p-value of the difference. Standard deviations are in parentheses for Columns 2 and 4. For Column 5, robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Impact of the Scandal on Exports: Industry-Level Analysis
Dep Var: Log (Export Value) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. All Dairy Exports
DairyXPost -1.065*** -0.892*** -0.685*** -1.140***
(0.080) (0.114) (0.238) (0.086)
FoodXPost -0.174
(0.139)
R-squared 0.964 0.963 0.970 0.980
Observations 1120 1386 1107 1120
Panel B. Innocent+Uninspected Firm-Products Only
DairyXPost -0.915*** -0.741*** -0.554** -0.848***
(0.080) (0.114) (0.233) (0.086)
FoodXPost -0.174
(0.139)
R-squared 0.964 0.963 0.970 0.980
Observations 1120 1386 1107 1120
Year, Industry FEs YES YES YES YES
YearXValue Share to different continents NO NO YES NO
Industry time trends NO NO NO YES
Excluding the food sector YES NO YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for Equation 1. Panel A contains all exporters, collapsed to the
industry-year level. Panel B excludes contaminated firm-products to quantify the aggregate spillover effect. We
create a balanced panel at the industry (HS two-digit) and year level. The dependent variable is log annual
export value for each industry. The baseline specification in Column 1 includes only year and industry fixed
effects. Columns 3 and 4 build on this specification by adding time-varying controls, including the value share
exported to different continents at baseline (2000-2007) interacted with year indicators and industry-specific linear
time trends. Columns 1, 3 and 4 exclude non-dairy food industries; Column 2 includes all HS two-digit industries.
Standard errors clustered at the product (HS two-digit) level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5,
and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table 4: Impact of the Scandal on Exports: Firm-Product-Level Analysis
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Log (Price) Exporting (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFirm-ProductXPost -0.489 -0.345 -0.122 -0.019
(1.180) (1.157) (0.091) (0.078)
CFirmXPost -1.838*** -1.811*** 0.209*** -0.153***
(0.437) (0.456) (0.051) (0.031)
CProductXPost -0.773*** -0.757*** -0.157* -0.064***
(0.281) (0.257) (0.087) (0.023)
IFirm-ProductXPost 1.083 0.981 -0.211** 0.081
(0.978) (0.929) (0.083) (0.071)
IFirmXPost -0.944 -0.847 0.219** -0.081
(0.768) (0.708) (0.097) (0.063)
R-squared 0.285 0.299 0.903 0.211
Observations 13775 13775 1519 13775
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for Equation 2. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-year
level. The sample contains all dairy exporters (excluding intermediaries) in the Chinese Customs data (2000-
2013). We rectangularize the data to create a balanced panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level
for the outcomes in Columns 1, 2 and 4. Columns 1 and 2 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
transformation of the outcome variables of interest, export value and export quantity. Column 3 presents results
for the natural logarithm of unit price, while Column 4 uses an indicator for positive exports as the outcome
variable. The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five
group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-Product, (C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-
Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category includes innocent and uninspected products from uninspected
firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-
2007) total export volume. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and product-year level. *** denotes
significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table 5: Impact of the Scandal on Firms’ Domestic Performance
Log (Total sales revenue) Log (Domestic sales revenue) Log (Employment)
(1) (2) (3)
CFirmsXPost -0.315 -0.309 -0.181
(0.255) (0.255) (0.235)
IFirmsXPost -0.036 -0.027 -0.099
(0.089) (0.091) (0.067)
R-squared 0.884 0.882 0.839
Observations 1664 1665 1666
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the effects of the scandal on firms’ sales and employment. The unit of
observation is at the firm-year level. The sample includes the balanced sample of dairy firms in the Manufacturing Survey
data (2005-2009 and 2011-2013). We compute a firm’s domestic sales by subtracting export sales from total sales; in cases
where export information is missing in the Manufacturing Survey data, we merge the sample with the Customs data and fill in
the missing export sales information whenever we can. The interaction terms are the post-scandal indicator (2009-2013) with
the following two group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is uninspected firms. All
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s total sales revenue from 2005 to 2007. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Impact Based on the Google Search Index
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Exporting (dummy)
High Low Rest High Low Rest High Low Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CFirm-ProductXPost -1.101 -0.068 -0.208 -0.958 -0.026 -0.180 -0.061 0.005 -0.014
(1.391) (0.963) (0.452) (1.349) (0.929) (0.420) (0.094) (0.062) (0.033)
CFirmXPost -0.571 -1.678*** -0.739*** -0.650 -1.585*** -0.690*** -0.055 -0.132*** -0.062***
(0.639) (0.595) (0.230) (0.657) (0.586) (0.219) (0.047) (0.049) (0.018)
CProductXPost -0.025 -0.639*** -0.367*** -0.057 -0.591*** -0.341*** -0.001 -0.053*** -0.031***
(0.153) (0.195) (0.141) (0.138) (0.183) (0.130) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011)
IFirm-ProductXPost 0.391 0.713 0.676 0.363 0.649 0.621 0.023 0.047 0.062
(0.496) (0.756) (0.543) (0.494) (0.723) (0.513) (0.038) (0.059) (0.042)
IFirmXPost -0.259 -0.452 -0.810 -0.231 -0.410 -0.725 -0.026 -0.035 -0.069
(0.368) (0.382) (0.637) (0.362) (0.346) (0.592) (0.037) (0.031) (0.049)
R-squared 0.418 0.294 0.255 0.440 0.296 0.254 0.341 0.242 0.224
Observations 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the heterogeneous effects of the scandal across export destinations with different information accuracy. The
unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample contains all dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013). We create a balanced
panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level. Columns 1-6 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the outcome
variables of interest, export value and export quantity. Columns 7-9 use an indicator for positive exports as the outcome variable. We categorize export
destinations by high and low information accuracy, using the Google search intensity ratio. High-information-accuracy destinations display a high ratio of
searches for the word “Sanlu” relative to searches for “2008 Chinese milk scandal”. We also include results for countries without a Google search index
(“Rest”). The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-
Product, (C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is innocent and uninspected
products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-2007) total
export revenue. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and product-year level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.5, and * at
the 0.1 level.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous Impact by Firms’ Sourcing Location
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Log (Price) Exporting (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CProductXPost -0.587** -0.551** -0.164 -0.045**
(0.274) (0.259) (0.110) (0.021)
CSourceCity-ProductXPost 0.030 0.050 0.053 0.023
(0.554) (0.520) (0.096) (0.045)
CSourceCityXPost -0.090 -0.113 0.027 -0.002
(0.274) (0.257) (0.083) (0.022)
R-squared 0.313 0.319 0.898 0.248
Observations 8768 8768 1098 8768
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the heterogeneous effects of the scandal on exports across firms with
different baseline sourcing locations. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample contains
innocent and uninspected dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013). We create a balanced panel at the
firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level for the outcomes in Columns 1, 2, and 4. Columns 1 and 2 present results
for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the outcome variables of interest, export value and export quantity.
Column 3 presents results for the natural logarithm of unit price, while Column 4 uses an indicator for positive exports as
the outcome variable. The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following
three group indicators: (C)ontaminatedProduct, (C)ontaminatedSourceCity-Product and (C)ontaminatedSourceCity. All
regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-2007) total export
revenue. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the product-year and firm level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, **
at the 0.5, and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Impact by Firms’ Export Experience
IHS (Value) Exporting (dummy)
Established New Established New Established New Established New
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CFirm-ProductXPost -0.678 -1.251*** -0.760 -0.943*** -0.032 -0.091*** -0.036 -0.068*
(1.419) (0.433) (1.423) (0.332) (0.092) (0.034) (0.092) (0.039)
CFirmXPost -1.119** -2.098*** -1.069** -2.112** -0.084** -0.190*** -0.082** -0.192***
(0.502) (0.712) (0.508) (0.832) (0.035) (0.063) (0.035) (0.073)
CProductXPost -0.390 -1.520*** -0.214 -1.160*** -0.034 -0.115*** -0.026 -0.089***
(0.358) (0.438) (0.411) (0.382) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030)
IFirm-ProductXPost -0.456 2.979* -0.463 2.787 -0.026 0.199* -0.026 0.185
(0.831) (1.764) (0.821) (1.843) (0.061) (0.120) (0.060) (0.126)
IFirmXPost -0.597 -1.714 -0.583 -1.375 -0.047 -0.147 -0.048 -0.122
(0.798) (1.209) (0.794) (1.209) (0.067) (0.093) (0.067) (0.093)
R-squared 0.339 0.228 0.340 0.230 0.252 0.206 0.253 0.208
Observations 9830 3945 9830 3945 9830 3945 9830 3945
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HS2digitXYear YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
H2digitXPost NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the heterogeneous effects of the scandal on exports across firms with different lengths of export experience. The
unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample contains all dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013). We create a balanced
panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level. Columns 1-4 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the outcome
variable of interest, export value. Columns 5-8 use an indicator for positive exports as the outcome variable. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 use the subsample of
established firms, which are firms that had exported for more than 1 year before 2008. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 use the subsample of new firms, which are firms
that had not exported before 2008. The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five group indicators:
(C)ontaminatedFirm-Product, (C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is innocent
and uninspected products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-2007)
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Melamine, all food Melamine and China, all food
*all food products
Notes: This figure plots the total number of safety notifications regarding melamine for imported food products and the number
of melamine notifications specific to China in the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). The red line represents the
month of the initial outbreak of the scandal: September 2008. The RASFF is a system for reporting food safety issues in the
European Union.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Total imports Dairy imports Milk powder imports
Notes: This figure plots the value of all Chinese imports as well as imports of dairy products and milk powder from 2000 to
2013.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Total exports Exports to major milk-powder importing countries
Notes: This figure plots the value of all Chinese exports and the value of exports to major milk powder-importing countries
from China (including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Iraq, Bangladesh, Burma, the Philippines and UAE).
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Figure A.4: Number of Export Products and Destinations across Firms
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Notes: This figure plots number of firms with different median numbers of products and numbers of destinations in the
pre-scandal (Panel A) and post-scandal (Panel B) periods. Contaminated firms appear in the left column and innocent plus
uninspected firms in the right column. Dairy firms are defined as firms that ever exported dairy products between 2000 and
2013, while non-dairy food firms are defined as firms that exported food products but never exported dairy products between
2000 and 2013. 51
Figure A.5: Examples of News Reports in Domestic and Foreign Countries
Notes: The figure in the left panel shows a Chinese news report on the results of the first round of inspections. The figure
on the right is a typical article in foreign media reporting the same news. Chinese news media usually provided a full list of
contaminated firms, while foreign news outlets usually did not. The firms mentioned in Chinese news outlets include Shijiazhuang
Sanlu Group, Shanghai Panda Dairy, Qingdao Shengyuan Dairy, Shanxi Gu Cheng Dairy, Jiangxi Guangming Yingxiong Dairy,
Baoji Huimin Dairy, Inner Mongolia Mengniu Dairy, Torador Dairy Industry (Tianjin), Guangdong Yashili Group, Hunan
Peiyi Dairy, Heilongjiang Qilin Dairy, Shanxi Yashili Dairy, Shenzhen Jinbishi Milk, Scient (Guangzhou) Infant Nutrition,
Guangzhou Jinding Dairy Products Factory, Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group, Yantai Ausmeadow Nutriment, Qingdao
Suncare Nutritional Technology, Xi’an Baiyue Dairy, Yantai Leilei Dairy, Shanghai Baoanli Dairy, and Fuding Chenguan Dairy.
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Figure A.6: Google Search Index across Provinces in China
Notes: This figure plots the Google search index for the term “Sanlu” across provinces in China in 2008.
53
Figure A.7: Histogram of Baseline Export Revenue Share
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of the baseline (2007) export revenue share in total sales revenue for dairy firms in the
Manufacturing Survey data that can be matched to the Chinese Customs data.
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Table A.1: Baseline Summary Statistics: Non-Dairy Food Industry
Contaminated Innocent Uninspected Contaminated vs. Uninspected
Number Mean Number Mean Number Mean Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Customs Database
Avg. yearly export revenue 26 2.91 19 .58 37264 .55 2.35 .014
(in million dollars) . (4.98) . (1.01) . (3.69) (.96) .
Years of exporting 26 5.23 19 4.32 37264 2.75 2.48 0
. (2.44) . (2.34) . (2.05) (.47) .
% exports to OECD countries 26 .68 19 .57 37264 .69 -.01 .929
(conditioning on exporting) . (.32) . (.40) . (.40) (.06) .
Panel B. Manufacturing Survey
Employment 23 920 30 402 24239 174 746 .025
. (1629) . (822) . (436) (332) .
Log (employment) 23 5.94 29 5.31 23849 4.40 1.54 0
. (1.25) . (1.06) . (1.15) (.26) .
Sales revenue (in million RMB) 19 268 19 242 13164 61 207 .039
. (450) . (543) . (256) (100) .
Log (sales revenue) 19 4.61 19 3.96 12850 2.91 1.70 0
. (1.51) . (1.70) . (1.45) (.34) .
Notes: Panel A is obtained from the baseline (2000-2007) Customs database linked with the inspection list to identify contaminated, innocent and uninspected
firms. Panel B is obtained from the baseline (2005-2007) Manufacturing Survey, which is also linked with the inspection list. The unit of observation is
collapsed to the firm level. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the number of firms that fall into each category. Column 7 is the difference between contaminated firms
(Column 2) and uninspected firms (Column 6), obtained through a simple regression of the outcome variable on a contaminated group dummy. Column 8 is
the p-value of the difference. Standard deviations are in parentheses for Columns 2, 4 and 6. For Column 7, robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Balance Check for the Second Round of Inspections
Inspected Uninspected
Number Mean Number Mean Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Export Performance
Total value of milk powder exported in 2007 8 7.60 196 .43 7.17 0
(in million dollars) . (19.91) . (1.78) (1.48) .
Total value of milk powder exported to OECD countries in 2007 8 1.27 196 0.02 1.25 0
(in million dollars) . (3.45) . (0.27) (0.25) .
Total quantity of milk powder exported in 2007 8 2.52 196 0.16 2.36 0
(in million kiloton) . (6.52) . (0.65) (0.49) .
Total quantity of milk powder exported to OECD countries in 2007 8 0.44 196 0.01 0.43 0
(in million kiloton) . (1.21) . (0.12) (0.09) .
Avg. price of exported milk powder in 2007 6 3.00 62 2.76 .24 .591
. (.40) . (1.09) (.45) .
Avg. price of milk powder exported to OECD countries in 2007 2 2.60 12 2.76 -.16 .862
. (.43) . (1.19) (.87) .
Baseline total export value (2000-2007) 8 26.92 196 77.74 -50.82 .672
(in million dollars) . (58.73) . (337.93) (119.83) .
Baseline number of exporting years (2000-2007) 8 3 196 3.43 -.43 .665
. (2.97) . (2.76) (1.00) .
Exported for more than 1 year prior to 2008 (dummy) 8 .5 196 .66 -.16 .360
. (.54) . (.48) (.17) .
Panel B. Domestic Performance
Private Enterprise (dummy) 88 .30 827 .40 -.10 .050
. (.46) . (.49) (.05) .
Employment 88 596 827 230 366 .025
. (1535) . (423) (163) .
Log (employment) 88 5.07 827 4.81 .26 .092
. (1.42) . (1.06) (.16) .
Sales revenue 88 418 820 138 279 .072
(in million RMB) . (1452) . (418) (155) .
Log (sales revenue) 88 4.06 820 3.76 .30 .114
. (1.72) . (1.42) (.19) .
Notes: Panel A is obtained from the baseline (2000-2007) Customs database linked with the inspection list to identify inspected and uninspected firms in the second
round of government inspections. Panel B is obtained from the baseline (2005-2007) Manufacturing Survey, which is also linked with the inspection list. The unit of
observation is collapsed to the firm level. Columns 1 and 3 show the number of firms that fall into each category in the second round of inspections. Column 5 is the
difference between inspected firms (Column 2) and uninspected firms (Column 4), obtained through a simple regression of the outcome variable on an inspected group
dummy. Column 6 is the p-value of the difference. Standard deviations are in parentheses in Columns 2 and 4. In Column 5, robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.3: Impact of the Scandal on Imports: Industry-Level Analysis
Dep Var: Log (Import Value) (1) (2) (3)
Dairy, Post Scandal 0.912*** 0.559*** 0.419***
(0.077) (0.082) (0.059)
Food, Post Scandal 0.353***
(0.112)
Observations 1106 1372 1106
Year, Industry FEs YES YES YES
Industry time trends NO NO YES
Excluding the food sector YES NO YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for Equation 1 with log annual
import value as the outcome variable. The sample for this analysis includes
all importers, collapsed to the industry-year level. We create a balanced panel
at the industry (HS two-digit) and year level. The baseline specification in
Column 1 includes year and industry fixed effects only. Column 3 builds on this
specification by adding industry-specific linear time trends. Columns 1 and 3
exclude non-dairy food industries; Column 2 include all HS two-digit industries.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry (HS two-digit) level. *** denotes
significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table A.4: Robustness Checks of the Firm-Product-Level Analysis
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Log (Price) Exporting (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Alternative Fixed Effects
CFirm-ProductXPost 1.766 1.806 0.013 0.123
(1.167) (1.142) (0.198) (0.089)
CFirmXPost -2.862*** -2.819*** 0.240** -0.218***
(0.394) (0.423) (0.099) (0.031)
CProductXPost -0.600** -0.601** -0.159 -0.046**
(0.268) (0.244) (0.133) (0.022)
IFirm-ProductXPost 1.137 1.078 0.004 0.092
(0.939) (0.894) (0.133) (0.070)
IFirmXPost -0.857 -0.802 0.275** -0.084
(0.792) (0.726) (0.129) (0.063)
Observations 13775 13775 1631 13775
Panel B. Differential Time Trends
CFirm-ProductXPost -0.542 -0.389 -0.198* -0.025
(1.170) (1.147) (0.118) (0.077)
CFirmXPost -1.795*** -1.778*** 0.304*** -0.148***
(0.453) (0.467) (0.063) (0.032)
CProductXPost -0.605* -0.619** -0.059 -0.046
(0.348) (0.311) (0.096) (0.028)
IFirm-ProductXPost 1.068 0.970 -0.197** 0.079
(0.979) (0.930) (0.081) (0.072)
IFirmXPost -0.916 -0.828 0.227** -0.077
(0.782) (0.721) (0.092) (0.064)
Observations 13775 13775 1519 13775
Panel C. Confounding Demand Shocks
CFirm-ProductXPost -0.560 -0.434 -0.121 -0.025
(1.284) (1.256) (0.097) (0.083)
CFirmXPost -0.700 -0.792* 0.203*** -0.048
(0.440) (0.458) (0.059) (0.030)
CProductXPost -0.516* -0.480* -0.160* -0.038
(0.288) (0.270) (0.096) (0.023)
IFirm-ProductXPost 0.606 0.546 -0.182* 0.047
(0.930) (0.912) (0.096) (0.065)
IFirmXPost -0.168 -0.157 0.223** -0.008
(0.689) (0.640) (0.108) (0.058)
Observations 8838 8838 1226 8838
Notes: This table shows results for the same sample as in Table 4. All panels control for baseline size interacted
with a post-scandal indicator. The unit of observation is a firm-product-year. Panel A includes firm, product,
and province-year fixed effects. Panel B includes firm-product and year fixed effects and controls for linear time
trends at the HS two-digit level. Panel C includes firm-product and year fixed effects and controls for firm-specific
foreign demand shocks. For each firm, we compute the baseline export value share for each destination country
averaged over 2000-2007. For each country-year in the UN Comtrade data, we compute the country’s dairy import
value excluding Chinese imports. For each firm-year-country, we multiply the country’s yearly dairy import value
excluding China by the firm’s baseline value share for that country. Each year, the firm-specific demand shock is
the sum across destination countries. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and product-year level. ***
denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at the 0.1 level.58
Table A.5: Variation in the Data across Firms, Products and Years
2000-2007 2009-2013
Contaminated Products Innocent+Uninspected Products Contaminated Products Innocent+Uninspected Products
Dairy Non-dairy Dairy Non-dairy Dairy Non-dairy Dairy Non-dairy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. All Destinations
Contaminated firms 77 196 41 269 25 132 12 113
Innocent+Uninspected firms 922 17503 1056 481814 353 9516 850 277038
Panel B. Dropping Destinations with Bans
Contaminated firms 69 182 34 225 25 123 12 101
Innocent+Uninspected firms 758 13757 610 322554 284 7484 529 191602
Notes: This table shows the number of observations falling into different firm-product-year cells, where products are identified at the HS eight-digit level, for the linked Customs-inspection list
sample used for the analysis in Section 5.
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Table A.6: Robustness Check of the Firm-Product-Level Analysis: Growth Spike Prior to the Scandal
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Exporting (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CFirm-ProductXPost 1.024 -0.017 0.355 1.164 0.068 0.490 0.080 -0.014 0.036
(1.100) (0.582) (0.811) (1.066) (0.545) (0.771) (0.089) (0.047) (0.072)
CFirmXPost -1.986*** -1.972*** -1.693** -2.015*** -1.862*** -1.631** -0.168*** -0.158*** -0.142**
(0.514) (0.480) (0.689) (0.546) (0.452) (0.664) (0.036) (0.038) (0.066)
CProductXPost -0.746*** -0.799*** -0.848*** -0.731*** -0.742*** -0.792*** -0.063*** -0.077*** -0.082***
(0.266) (0.265) (0.259) (0.243) (0.246) (0.241) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
IFirm-ProductXPost 0.942 -0.608 -0.791 0.837 -0.633 -0.825 0.071 -0.049 -0.069
(1.107) (0.762) (0.791) (1.049) (0.727) (0.770) (0.083) (0.056) (0.060)
IFirmXPost -0.513 -0.561 -0.245 -0.444 -0.464 -0.154 -0.057 -0.046 -0.029
(0.801) (0.570) (0.531) (0.747) (0.516) (0.482) (0.070) (0.046) (0.044)
Observations 12893 9043 8384 12893 9043 8384 12893 9043 8384
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSize×Post YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table shows the main results excluding firms and destinations that contributed over 80% of the growth spike of dairy exports between 2006 and 2007. The
unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample contains all dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013). We create a balanced panel
at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level for the outcomes in all columns. Columns 1-6 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation
of the outcome variables of interest, namely, export value and export quantity, while Columns 7-9 use an indicator for positive exports as the outcome variable.
Columns 1, 4, and 7 include all dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data, excluding firms that contributed over 80% of the growth spike of dairy exports between
2006 and 2007. Columns 2, 5, and 8 drop the export destinations that contributed over 80% of the growth spike of dairy exports between 2006 and 2007. Columns
3, 6, and 9 drop both the identified firms and destinations. The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five
group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-Product, (C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category
is innocent and uninspected products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline
(2000-2007) total export revenue. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-product and year level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and *
at the 0.1 level.
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Table A.7: Robustness Check of Firm-Product-Level Analysis: Government Regulations
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Log (Price) Exporting (dummy)
w/o Bans All w/o Bans All w/o Bans All w/o Bans All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CFirm-ProductXPost -0.695 -0.489 -0.515 -0.345 -0.102 -0.122 -0.027 -0.019
(1.606) (1.180) (1.547) (1.157) (0.096) (0.091) (0.107) (0.078)
CFirmXPost -1.519* -1.838*** -1.535** -1.811*** 0.216*** 0.209*** -0.134** -0.153***
(0.773) (0.437) (0.760) (0.456) (0.071) (0.051) (0.053) (0.031)
CProductXPost -0.904*** -0.773*** -0.878*** -0.757*** -0.204** -0.157* -0.070*** -0.064***
(0.307) (0.281) (0.280) (0.257) (0.091) (0.087) (0.025) (0.023)
IFirm-ProductXPost 1.540 1.083 1.420 0.981 -0.147 -0.211** 0.108 0.081
(1.084) (0.978) (1.023) (0.929) (0.090) (0.083) (0.078) (0.071)
IFirmXPost -0.751 -0.944 -0.660 -0.847 0.203* 0.219** -0.062 -0.081
(0.857) (0.768) (0.793) (0.708) (0.104) (0.097) (0.071) (0.063)
Observations 9877 13775 9877 13775 1113 1519 9877 13775
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This table compares regression results for exports to countries without explicit import bans on Chinese dairy products to our baseline estimates
from Table 4, reported here in Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 for ease of visualization. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample
in Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 contains dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013), excluding firm-products exported to countries with
bans. We create a balanced panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level. Columns 1-4 present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) transformation of the outcome variables of interest, export value (Columns 1 and 2) and export quantity (Columns 3 and 4). Columns 5 and
6 present results for the natural logarithm of unit price, while Columns 7 and 8 use an indicator for positive exports as the outcome variable. The
interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-Product,
(C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is innocent and uninspected
products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-2007) total
export revenue. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm-product and year level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at
the 0.1 level.
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Table A.8: Heterogeneous Impact Based on the Google Search Index
IHS (Value) IHS (Quantity) Exporting
>75 perc 50-75 perc 25-50 perc <25 perc >75 perc 50-75 perc 25-50 perc <25 perc >75 perc 50-75 perc 25-50 perc <25 perc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CFirm-ProductXPost -1.101 0.376 -0.150 -0.811 -0.958 0.380 -0.136 -0.772 -0.061 0.032 -0.019 -0.047
(1.391) (0.447) (0.329) (0.995) (1.349) (0.464) (0.298) (0.957) (0.094) (0.035) (0.027) (0.067)
CFirmXPost -0.571 -0.640 -0.544*** -0.869* -0.650 -0.625 -0.500*** -0.822* -0.055 -0.051 -0.047*** -0.068**
(0.639) (0.474) (0.166) (0.447) (0.657) (0.491) (0.156) (0.420) (0.047) (0.038) (0.014) (0.034)
CProductXPost -0.025 -0.236** -0.237** -0.337** -0.057 -0.195* -0.226** -0.313** -0.001 -0.021** -0.021** -0.027**
(0.152) (0.115) (0.110) (0.136) (0.138) (0.105) (0.107) (0.127) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
IFirm-ProductXPost 0.391 0.075 0.182 0.324 0.363 0.050 0.175 0.281 0.023 0.003 0.012 0.019
(0.496) (0.514) (0.147) (0.523) (0.494) (0.512) (0.138) (0.486) (0.038) (0.043) (0.014) (0.040)
IFirmXPost -0.259 -0.338 -0.406*** 0.094 -0.231 -0.301 -0.379*** 0.085 -0.026 -0.030* -0.034*** 0.009
(0.368) (0.226) (0.130) (0.286) (0.362) (0.205) (0.122) (0.255) (0.037) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025)
Observations 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775 13775
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table shows the regression results for the heterogeneous effects of the scandal on exports across destinations with different information accuracy. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level.
The sample contains all dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2000-2013). We create a balanced panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level. Columns 1-8 present results for the inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS) transformation of the outcome variables of interest, export value and export quantity. Columns 9-12 use an indicator for positive exports as the outcome variable. We categorize countries by high and low
information accuracy about the scandal, using the Google search intensity ratio. “>75 perc” destinations have a ratio of searches for the word “Sanlu” relative to searches for “2008 Chinese milk scandal” in the top
quartile; “50-75 perc” destinations have a ratio in the third quartile; “25-50 perc” destinations have a ratio in the second quartile; and “<25 perc” destinations have a ratio in the bottom quartile. We exclude results
for countries without a Google search index from this table. The interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-Product,
(C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is innocent and uninspected products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product
and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline total export revenue. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and product-year level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and *
at the 0.1 level.
62
Table A.9: Heterogeneous Impact by Baseline Export Value Share
IHS (Value) Exporting (dummy)
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CFirm-ProductXPost -1.653 0.633 -1.666 0.590 -0.084 0.050 -0.084 0.048
(2.658) (1.551) (2.593) (1.564) (0.164) (0.117) (0.160) (0.119)
CFirmXPost -0.950 -2.712*** -0.877 -2.678*** -0.086 -0.238*** -0.081 -0.236***
(1.275) (0.851) (1.252) (0.875) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.083)
CProductXPost -0.097 -1.786** 0.301 -1.707* -0.021 -0.151** 0.004 -0.147*
(1.324) (0.836) (1.546) (0.933) (0.100) (0.074) (0.115) (0.082)
IFirm-ProductXPost -3.465*** -0.412 -3.464*** -0.428 -0.221*** -0.008 -0.220*** -0.009
(0.197) (0.935) (0.183) (0.957) (0.014) (0.088) (0.013) (0.090)
IFirmXPost -2.808*** 0.032 -2.773*** 0.083 -0.189*** -0.044 -0.188*** -0.042
(0.805) (0.985) (0.771) (1.011) (0.061) (0.095) (0.058) (0.098)
Observations 1568 1540 1568 1540 1568 1540 1568 1540
Firm-product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
BaselineSizeXPost YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HS2digitXYear YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
H2digitXPost NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the heterogeneous effects of the scandal on exports across firms with different baseline export value
shares. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-year level. The sample contains dairy exporters in the Chinese Customs data (2007) that can
be matched with the Manufacturing Survey data (2007). We create a balanced panel at the firm-product (HS eight-digit) and year level. Columns 1-4
present results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the outcome variable of interest, export value. Columns 5-8 use an indicator for
positive exports as the outcome variable. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 use the subsample of firms with a large baseline export value share, defined as above
the median of 9.77%. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 use the subsample of firms with a small baseline export value share, defined as below the median. The
interaction terms are the products of the post-scandal dummy (2009-2013) with the following five group indicators: (C)ontaminatedFirm-Product,
(C)ontaminatedFirm, (C)ontaminatedProduct, (I)nnocentFirm-Product, and (I)nnocentFirm. The omitted category is innocent and uninspected
products from uninspected firms. All regressions include firm-product and year fixed effects. Baseline size measures a firm’s baseline (2000-2007) total
export value. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and product-year level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5, and * at
the 0.1 level.
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Appendix B: Data Appendix and Codebooks
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Table B.1: Destinations that Imposed Import Bans on Chinese Dairy Products
Country Value Share of dairy Value share of milk powder Year lifted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taiwan .114762 .275012
EU .092145 .000025 2015
US .045939 .000060
Singapore .027706 .014324 2009
Philippines .026908 .021784
Bangladesh .015800 .040019




India .002123 .001910 2017
Ghana .001603 .002978
Ivory Coast .001298 .003214
Gabon .000357 .000923





Ivory Coast 0 0
Kyrgyzstan 0 0
Notes: This table shows the list of destinations that imposed bans on Chinese dairy/food products
due to the scandal. For each destination, we report the value share of dairy products exported to
the destination prior to the scandal (2000-2007), the value share of milk powder products exported
to the destination prior to the scandal (2000-2007), and the year that the bans were lifted.
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Table B.2: HS Eight-Digit Codebook for Dairy Products
HS Eight-Digit Code Product Category Product Description Baseline Export Value Share
04011000 fresh milk products Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, not exceeding 1% 0.00%
04012000 fresh milk products Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 1% but not exceeding 6% 18.44%
04013000 fresh milk products Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 6% 0.26%
04014000 fresh milk products Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 6% but not exceeding 10% 0.00%
04015000 fresh milk products Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, of a fat content, by weight, exceeding 10% 0.00%
04021000 milk powder Milk and cream in solid forms of ≤ 1.5% fat 3.36%
04022100 milk powder Milk and cream in solid forms of > 1.5% fat, unsweetened 28.49%
04022900 milk powder Milk and cream in solid forms of > 1.5% fat, sweetened 6.88%
04029100 condensed milk products Concentrated milk and cream, unsweetened ( excl. in solid form ) 3.54%
04029900 condensed milk products Sweetened milk and cream ( excl. in solid form ) 5.99%
04031000 cultured milk products Yogurt 0.1%
04039000 cultured milk products Buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, etc ( excl. yogurt ) 0.41%
04041000 whey products Whey and modified whey 0.01%
04049000 whey products Other products consisting of natural milk constituents 0.75%
04051000 milk fat products Butter 1.09%
04052000 milk fat products Dairy spreads 0.00%
04059000 milk fat products Other fats and oils derived from milk 0.46%
04061000 cheese products Fresh cheese, incl. whey cheese and curd 1.27%
04062000 cheese products Grated or powdered cheese, of all kinds 0.00%
04063000 cheese products Processed cheese, not grated or powdered 0.01%
04064000 cheese products Blue-veined cheese and other cheese containing veins produced by penicillium requefort 0.00%
04069000 cheese products Other cheese 0.02%
19011000 infant formula Preparations for infant use, for retail sale 0.64%
19019000 malted milk products Other food preparations of malt extract, flour; dairy products(Cocoa content:¡40% of powder, starch or malt extract, or Cocoa contents:¡5% of dairy products) 11.57%
35011000 milk protein produts Casein 16.67%
35022000 milk protein produts Milk albumin, incl. concentrates of two or more whey proteins 0.04%
Notes : The HS code for infant formula is 1901100010. Since the HS ten-digit information is not available in the Customs data, we use the eight-digit code 19011000 to indicate infant formula. The baseline export value share
is the export value share across all dairy products from 2000 to 2007.
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Appendix C: Industry-Level Analysis: Alternative Strategies
This section investigates whether the results obtained in the DD framework are robust to
relaxing the parallel trends assumption at the industry level. Specifically, C.1 and C.2
allow for unobserved interactions between time-varying factors and industry fixed effects
(FE) using interactive fixed effects (IFE). Gobillon and Magnac (2016) discuss how the IFE
method generalizes the synthetic control design when the matching variables (i.e., factor
loadings and exogenous covariates) of the treated unit do not belong to the convexified
support of the matching variables of the control units, which they call the extrapolation
case. Given the unique growth path of the Chinese dairy industry prior to the scandal, we
might very well find ourselves in the extrapolation case. Nonetheless, the synthetic control
analysis reassuringly confirms both our baseline and IFE estimates. Given this battery of
robustness checks, we are confident that our DD estimates capture the true effect of the
scandal on the export performance of the Chinese dairy industry, and we report these DD
estimates as our preferred ones.
C.1 Interactive Fixed Effects
Following Gobillon and Magnac (2016), we use least squares minimization to estimate Equa-
tion (3), where δt is an L×1 vector of time factors and γj is an L×1 vector of factor loadings
(Bai, 2009). The IFE model assumes that the interaction term δ
′
t ∗ γj fully describes the
unobserved heterogeneity and that the dimension of the time factors and factor loadings, L,
is known. Our estimates are robust to different values of L.
Yjt = βdairyDairyj × Postt + δ
′
t ∗ γj + πXjt + εjt (3)
Our estimates of Equation (3) show that the DD estimates are virtually identical to the
equivalent IFE models of dimension one. For example, the baseline specification without
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controls in Column 1 of Table C.1, Panel A, estimates that the scandal decreased the value
of Chinese dairy exports by 65.6%. Adding controls for the value share of the industry
exported to different continents at baseline interacted with year indicators in Column 5
yields an estimated decrease in the export value of 68.2%, very similar to our preferred
estimate in Column 4 of Table 3 with controls for the industry-specific linear trend in the
DD setting. Similarly, Column 4 of Table C.1 can be compared to Column 2 of Table 3 to
confirm that the scandal did not significantly affect non-dairy food exports.
Finally, Columns 2 and 3 of Table C.1 allow for increasingly multi-dimensional interac-
tions between time factors and industry factor loadings. These models estimate an impact of
the scandal on dairy exports that is larger in magnitude than the one that we estimate in the
classic DD model. Because the dimension of these IFE models is set somewhat arbitrarily
or assumed to be known (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016), our preferred estimate remains the
more conservative one in Column 4 of Table 3, that is, a 68% decrease in the value of dairy
exports following the scandal.
Panel B of Table C.1 confirms the patterns shown in Panel B of Table 3: the spillover
effect of the scandal leads to a decrease in exports of innocent and uninspected firm-products
that is smaller than the total effect of the scandal on the dairy sector. Specifically, using
IFE, we estimate spillover effects on exports characterized by a decrease of between 50 and
73%.
C.2 Synthetic Control
In the case of a single treated unit, synthetic control methods can successfully construct a
vector of weights such that a weighted combination of control units closely matches the time
series of the outcome variable for the treated unit in the pre-period (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010). We estimate the impact of the scandal as
the difference between the value of exports in the dairy industry and the synthetic unit
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We denote the dairy industry with index 1; w∗i are the optimal weights on control units;
and V ∗ minimizes the distance between the predicted pre-treatment outcomes of the treated
and synthetic control units, with predictions based on an arbitrary set of baseline covariates.
Specifically, we use an indicator for whether an industry was exporting in a given year and
the value share of the industry exported to different continents as the baseline covariates to
predict outcomes.
The solid line in Figure C.1 plots the natural logarithm of the value of exports for the
Chinese dairy industry over our sample period. As discussed in Section 2, we observe that
Chinese dairy exports grew substantially prior to the scandal. The dashed line plots the
natural logarithm of the value of exports for the synthetic control unit, created using indus-
try and covariate weights specified in Table C.2.26 Reassuringly, the synthetic control unit
mimics the growth of the dairy sector quite closely prior to 2009, the first year after the scan-
dal. Starting in 2009, while the synthetic control unit continues to grow through 2011, the
dairy industry experiences a drop in exports that persists through 2010, stabilizing around
the value levels observed in 2004-2006. Averaging the difference between the logarithm of
the value of exports of the dairy industry and the synthetic control unit before and after
the scandal, as described in Equation (4), we obtain an estimated impact of the scandal of
−71%, in line with our DD estimate.
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) prove that the bias of the synthetic control
estimator can be bounded by a function that goes to zero as the number of pre-treatment
periods increases. Intuitively, a longer baseline allows for a more precise calibration of the
26This table shows that the weights selected by the data-driven algorithm in the synthetic control method-
ology appear to be somewhat disconnected from those predicted by economic theory, leaving doubts as to
the interpretation of the results. Moreover, the weights are positive for only a handful of industries (Panel
A) and heavily skewed on a handful of covariates.
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weights, which improves the match between the treated and control outcomes. As our sample
only provides eight years of pre-scandal data, we might worry that the estimated impact of
the scandal is confounded by residual unobserved differences between the dairy industry and
the synthetic control unit. To assuage this concern, we perform inference by permuting the
treatment to each unit in our donor pool of control industries, following Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller (2010). Figure C.2 plots the difference in the logarithm of the value of
exports between each industry and that of its synthetic control unit over time. We can
contrast all the placebo differences (in grey) with the difference for the dairy industry (in
black) and observe that the dairy industry synthetic control provides a good match in the
pre-scandal period; i.e., the pre-scandal difference lies comfortably within the placebo band.
Moreover, there are only five other industries that display a larger treatment effect in the
post-scandal period. Given that we have 76 placebo differences, the p-value on our estimate,
i.e., the likelihood of erroneously rejecting the hypothesis of a null effect of the scandal on
the dairy industry, is 6/76, or 0.08.27
Analogously to the analysis in Panel B of Table 3, Figure C.3 shows the spillover effect of
the scandal on the sample of innocent and uninspected dairy firm-products. Unlike the DD
and IFE estimates, however, the synthetic control methodology estimates an indirect effect
of −74%, with a point estimate that is larger than the total effect of −71%.28 Nonetheless,
Figure C.4 shows that there are four industries with a larger placebo difference than the
dairy industry, implying a p-value on our estimate of 5/76, or 0.06. Therefore we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the indirect effect of the scandal on innocent and uninspected
firm-products is as large as the total effect on the entire dairy industry.
27The algorithm for the construction of the synthetic control unit for industries with HS codes 28, 32, and
99 fails to converge.
28Industry and covariate weights used to select the synthetic control unit plotted in Figure C.3 are shown
in Tables C.2
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2000 2005 2010 2015
year
treated unit synthetic control unit
Notes: This figure plots the natural logarithm of the value of exports for the dairy industry (solid line) and the synthetic
control unit (dashed line). The vertical dotted line indicates 2009, the first year after the scandal.
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Notes: This figure plots the difference in the log value of exports between each industry and its respective synthetic control
unit. The black line indicates the dairy industry. The vertical red line indicates 2009, the first year after the scandal.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
year
treated unit synthetic control unit
Notes: This figure plots the natural logarithm of the value of exports for the dairy industry excluding the contaminated
firm-products (solid line) and the synthetic control unit (dashed line). The vertical dotted line indicates 2009, the first year
after the scandal.
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Notes: This figure plots the difference in the log value of exports between each industry and its respective synthetic control
unit. The black line indicates the dairy industry excluding the contaminated firm-products. The vertical red line indicates
2009, the first year after the scandal.
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Table C.1: Interactive Fixed Effects Analysis at the HS Two-digit Industry Level
Dep Var: Log (Export Value) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. All Dairy Exports
DairyXPost -1.067*** -1.505*** -1.356*** -0.947*** -1.146***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.078) (0.090) (0.297)
FoodXPost -0.122
(0.119)
Observations 1120 1120 1120 1386 1106
Panel B. Innocent+Uninspected Firm-Products Only
DairyXPost -0.872*** -1.296*** -1.304*** -0.748*** -0.699**
(0.076) (0.062) (0.062) (0.089) (0.319)
FoodXPost -0.122
(0.119)
Observations 1120 1120 1120 1386 1106
Dimension of Factor Model 1 2 3 1 1
YearXValue Share to different continents NO NO NO NO YES
Whether Dropped Food YES YES YES NO YES
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the industry-level analysis using interactive fixed effect models. Panel A includes
all exporters, collapsed to the industry-year level. Panel B excludes contaminated firm-products to quantify the aggregate spillover
effect. We create a balanced panel at the industry (HS two-digit) and year level. The dependent variable is log annual export
value for each industry. Columns 1-3 use different dimensions for the factor model. All columns include year and industry fixed
effects. Column 5 adds a time-varying control, which is the value share exported to different continents at baseline (2000-2007)
interacted with year indicators. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 exclude non-dairy food industries; Column 4 includes all HS two-digit
industries. Standard errors are clustered at the product (HS two-digit) level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01, ** at the 0.5,
and * at the 0.1 level.
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Table C.2: Weights for Synthetic Control Analysis
All Dairy Exports Dairy Exports of Innocent and Uninspected Firm-Products
(1) (2)










Panel B. Covariates Weights
Log Value 974.6622 861.9878
Positive Exports 3.3724 0.0000030
Value Share to Asia 2.7599 0.00000003
Value Share to Europe 0.3773 135.5426
Value Share to Africa 0.1043 2.4695
Value Share to Oceania 0.0006853 0.0000010
Value Share to North America 18.5361 0.00000006
Value Share to Latin America 0.1872 0.0000020
Notes: The table shows the weights for industries for the synthetic control analysis for all dairy exports (Column 1) and dairy exports of
non-contaminated firm-products (Column 2). Panel A shows the non-zero weights assigned to industries at the HS two-digit level for the
synthetic control analysis. Panel B shows the weights(×1, 000) for covariates for the synthetic control analysis. HS 01 represents the live animals
industry. HS 14 represents the vegetable plaiting materials industry. HS 23 represents food industries producing residues and wastes thereof or
prepared animal fodder. HS 31 represents the fertilizers industry. HS 45 represents the cork and cork articles industry. HS 47 represents the
fibrous cellulosic material and recovered paper or paperboard industry. HS 60 represents the fabrics industry. HS 93 represents the arms and
ammunition industry. HS 98 comprises special classification provisions. HS 99 contains temporary modifications pursuant to a party’s national
directive or legislation.
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